Who signed this document?

A digital signature proves the document has not changed since it was signed. It does not, on its own, prove who pressed "Sign". So every signature on a certified NomaSign document also carries an identity proof: a short statement, sealed inside the signature, that says how the signer proved who they are.

The three levels

Because the proof sits inside the signature, nobody can change or remove it without breaking the signature. The sender chooses the Signer ID when they send the document. With OTP or Passkey, the signer picks one of the two, and the proof shows which one they used.

Confirmed with a passkey

The signer approved this exact signature on their own phone or computer, with Face ID, a fingerprint or their device PIN, and confirmed it with their Google or Microsoft account at the moment of signing.

Who you are trusting: Google or Microsoft, and the signer's device. Not NomaSign: you can check it yourself.

Email code, checked by NomaSign

The signer typed a one-time code that NomaSign sent to their email address.

Who you are trusting: NomaSign.

In person

The sender is responsible for the signer's identity, for example because they signed in front of them. NomaSign did not check it: anyone with the signing link could have signed.

Who you are trusting: The sender. The signature is valid; NomaSign did not check who signed.

Checking a passkey signature

The Digital Signature Validator does these checks for you, in your browser, without uploading the file:

  1. NomaSign's identity service issued it. The proof comes in a token that NomaSign's identity service signed when the signer pressed Sign. The validator checks that signature against NomaSign's published key, so a proof made anywhere else is rejected.
  2. The proof belongs to this signature. It names the exact signature it was made for, so it cannot be copied onto another document.
  3. The signer approved it on a device they trust. Their passkey signed it, after Face ID, a fingerprint or a PIN. The proof also shows whether the passkey is synced across the signer's devices (for example by Google Password Manager or iCloud Keychain) or kept on one device only.
  4. Google or Microsoft confirmed the signer at that moment. When the signer pressed Sign, they also confirmed with their Google or Microsoft account. The provider signed a statement naming this exact signature and the signer's email address.

The one check left to you

The validator cannot decide whether the key behind step 4 really belonged to Google or Microsoft. It shows a provider key id, so you can confirm that yourself:

  • Open the provider's published key list: Google or Microsoft.
  • Look for the key id ("kid"). Providers replace their keys every few weeks, so for an older document it will no longer be there.
  • For older documents, the Internet Archive may have a copy of the key list from around the date of the signature: Google, Microsoft. The Internet Archive is independent of NomaSign and makes no promise that a copy exists.

If the key id is in the list, the check is complete. That is outside proof of the identity check: it is Google or Microsoft saying the signer had access to that email account, not NomaSign saying so.

Technical details

For developers, auditors and anyone writing their own checker. The format is open; nothing below is secret.

Where it sits

  • A CMS signed attribute of the PAdES signature, so the signature covers it.
  • Attribute: ETSI signer-attributes-v2, OID 0.4.0.19122.1.1 (ETSI EN 319 122-1, 5.2.6.1).
  • Inside it: signedAssertions [2], one SignedAssertion with type id-aa-ets-signedAssertion (0.4.0.19122.1.6). Its value is a PrintableString holding the base64 of a JWT signed by NomaSign; its identity_proof claim is the proof.
  • The JSON field type is 1.3.6.1.4.1.67384.1.1, NomaSign's IANA Private Enterprise Number. Other software may also use signer-attributes-v2; only proofs with this type are NomaSign identity proofs. Checkers should treat an unknown version as "newer, not readable" rather than as invalid.

The JSON (version 1)

{
  "type": "1.3.6.1.4.1.67384.1.1",
  "version": 1,
  "method": "passkey",
  "level": "device-verified",
  "signer": { "email": "signer@nomasign.com", "name": "Sam Signer" },
  "request": {
    "session": "<session id>",
    "participant": "<participant id>",
    "documents": [{ "documentId": "<id>", "hash": "<hex SHA-256 of the signed bytes>" }],
    "random": "<random string>"
  },
  "challenge": "<base64url>",
  "passkey": {
    "credentialId": "<base64url>",
    "publicKeyCose": "<base64url COSE key>",
    "clientDataJson": "<base64url>",
    "authenticatorData": "<base64url>",
    "signature": "<base64url>",
    "userHandle": "<base64url>",
    "authenticator": "Google Password Manager",
    "backedUp": true,
    "createdAt": "<ISO 8601>"
  },
  "provider": {
    "name": "Google",
    "idToken": "<the provider's signed ID token (JWT)>",
    "signingKey": { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "...", "n": "...", "e": "AQAB" },
    "nonce": { "purpose": "nomasign-sign-confirm-v1", "value": "<base64url>" },
    "emailAlias": false
  }
}

level is device-verified (passkey), nomasign-attested (email code: method otp, plus otp.verifiedAt) or link-holder (no check). The last two have no passkey or provider.

How to verify a passkey proof

  1. Issued by NomaSign: the JWT verifies with the certificate in its x5c header, a certificate issued to *.nomasign.com.
  2. Bound to the signature: one request.documents[].hash equals the signature's CMS messageDigest.
  3. Challenge: SHA-256 of these lines joined with \n: nomasign-sign-v1, request.session, request.participant, one documentId:hash line per document, request.random. Its base64url equals challenge and clientDataJson.challenge; clientDataJson.type is webauthn.get.
  4. Device signature (WebAuthn): signature verifies over authenticatorData || SHA-256(clientDataJson) with publicKeyCose (ES256, RS256 or EdDSA). The UP and UV flags in authenticatorData are set.
  5. Provider confirmation: the provider's signed sign-in token (idToken) has as its nonce the base64url SHA-256 of nomasign-sign-confirm-v1| followed by challenge, so it was made for this exact Sign press. It names the signer's email address and was issued to NomaSign before the signature's signing time. The email counts only when Google or Microsoft verified it through their own sign-in: a Gmail or Google Workspace account, or a Microsoft work or school account whose organisation verified its email domain. Personal Microsoft accounts and Google logins on other addresses do not count. When the signer was invited on another address of their Microsoft work account, NomaSign checked that with Microsoft at sign-in; the token itself names the account's main address.
  6. Provider key: the token header's kid was in the provider's published key list at the signature's signing time (see above).

Steps 1 to 5 need nothing but the PDF. Step 6 needs the provider's key list, or an archived copy of it, and it is what makes this outside proof of the identity check.

Questions about the identity proof

Can someone add or change the identity proof after signing?
No. The proof sits inside the signature, so changing or removing it breaks the signature.
Does the signer need a NomaSign account for a passkey?
The signer signs in once with their Google or Microsoft account and creates a passkey on their device. Each time they sign, they confirm with the passkey and their Google or Microsoft account. They need no NomaSign plan.
Is a passkey signature the same as a qualified or advanced electronic signature?
No. A passkey is strong proof of who approved the signature, but advanced and qualified signatures have their own legal requirements, which differ by country.
Why does the validator ask me to check a key id?
The file itself cannot prove that a key really belonged to Google or Microsoft, so the validator shows the key id for you to look up in the provider's published list.

Choose how your signers prove who they are

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